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Abstract 
This article examines how the pension insurance provided by the PBGC and the tax treatment of pen- 
sion plans affect the cost of labor and capital. Two important aspects of the insurance program are (1) 
the premium schedule and (2) an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits (the deductible). 
These two aspects interact to increase the cost of capital relative to labor, especially for firms with un- 
derfunded plans. 
1. Introduction 
This article analyzes the distortions on a firm's choice ,of labor and capital in- 
duced by the mandatory pension insurance program operated by the Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) and the preferential tax treatment of pen- 
sion plans. Black (1980), Tepper (1981), and Sharpe (1976) study how the insurance 
and tax arrangements affect the financial management of pension plans, holding 
a firm's production decisions fixed. In contrast, this article studies a firm's produc- 
tion decisions (choice of labor and capital), treating its financial pension policies 
as exogenous. 1 Thus, the focus is on the distortion of the real decisions of a firm 
caused by the government's pension policy. 
Under the PBGC insurance program, a firm's liability for unfunded pension 
benefits (the insurance contract's deductible) depends on the financial condition 
of the firm. For example, if the firm has zero net worth, then the deductible is zero 
and the PBGC must cover the entire unfunded liability. Thus, increases in a firm's 
cash flows decrease the risk facing the PBGC. The PBGC, however, does not 
charge premiums that vary with the firm's cash flows. Consequently, shareholders 
pay all of the costs of projects which increase the firm's cash flows, but they share 
the returns with the PBGC. Thus, the combination of  the PBGC's fee schedule and 
the sponsor's liability increases the required return on capital. The magnitude of 
this effect varies cross-sectionally depending on the funding status of the pension 
plan. For overfunded plans, the effect is inconsequential; however, for underfund- 
ed plans, the effect can be significant. 
Sharpe (1976) illustrates the moral hazard problems associated with the PBGC's 
fiat fee schedule: employers have as an incentive to underfund the plan and invest 
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in risky assets. Recent legislation has increased an employer's liability for unfund- 
ed pension benefits. This action can be justified on the grounds that it will help 
reduce the moral hazard problems associated with the flat premium schedule. 
However, this article shows that an increase in an employer's liability can also 
reduce the incentive for firms that are close to default on pension obligations to in- 
vest in capital. 
The PBGC insurance program also affects the cost of employing labor. If the 
pension benefits promised to labor are guaranteed by the PBGC, then an ad- 
ditional unit of labor increases the risk facing the PBGC. If the per employee in- 
surance premium is not sufficient to compensate the PBGC for its additional risk, 
then the PBGC reduces the cost of labor. For significantly underfunded plans, the 
magnitude of this effect can be important. 
The tax treatment of pension funds also affects the cost of employing labor. A 
corporate-sponsored pension plan enables employees to invest in taxable securi- 
ties without paying tax on investment returns until they are distributed. In addi- 
tion, shareholders can invest in the pension plan and earn the before-tax rate of 
return on taxable securities by contributing more to the plan than is needed to pay 
promised pension benefits (see Black, 1980, and Tepper, 1981). Since the IRS con- 
straint on overfunding is loosened by hiring additional labor, an additional unit of 
labor enables shareholders to earn additional tax benefits. 
The basic conclusion from the analysis is that the tax and insurance arrange- 
ments of the pension system tend to reduce the cost of labor relative to capital. 
This conclusion holds for both overfunded and underfunded pension plans. For 
overfunded plans, the tax treatment reduces the cost of labor. For underfunded 
plans, the insurance system subsidizes labor and claims part of the returns to capi- 
tal. Consequently, these institutional arrangements alter capital intensity in the 
United States. 
The article proceeds as follows. In section 2, I provide a brief description of the 
institutional arrangements governing pension plans. In section 3, I present the 
model and discuss the analytical results. The article concludes with a summary. 
2. Description of the pension system 
This article deals exclusively with corporate-sponsored, defined-benefit pension 
plans. Under a defined-benefit plan, employees are promised a specific benefit 
when they retire. The promised benefit usually depends on the salary and the ser- 
vice of the employee. The employer makes periodic contributions to a fund, from 
which the pension benefits are paid. 2 
Several aspects of the tax code are important for defined-benefit plans. First, 
corporate contributions are tax deductible. Second, earnings on pension assets are 
not taxed, at the corporate or personal levels, as they are earned. Third, dis- 
tributions from a pension fund are taxable when they are received. 
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The preferential tax treatment allows employees to save at a tax-deferred rate. In 
addition, Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) show that the tax treatment allows cor- 
porations to earn the before-tax rate of return on taxable securities. To take advan- 
tage of this opportunity, corporate sponsors contribute more to the fund than is 
needed to pay promised benefits and subsequently remove excess contributions) 
Prior to 1974, most pension benefits were not backed by the firm's assets. 4 
McGill (1974) reports that prior to 1974 only 13 percent of 225 surveyed firms 
backed some or all pension benefits with corporate assets. A firm that did not back 
benefits with corporate assets could terminate an underfunded plan and have no 
legal obligation to pay unfunded benefits. Thus, prior to 1974, an employer's 
liability for unfunded pension benefits was very limited, s 
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA). ERISA established a federal insurance agency, the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), to insure pension benefits. ERISA also made 
firms liable for unfunded pension liabilities up to 30 percent of their net worth. 
Thus, if an unfunded pension plan were terminated, the PBGC paid the difference 
between unfunded liabilities and 30 percent of the sponsor's net worth. 6 
In 1985, Congress passed the Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
(SEPPAA). SEPPAA changed the conditions under which a pension plan can be 
terminated. Prior to SEPPAA, a going concern could terminate an underfunded 
plan by paying the PBGC 30 percent of the firm's net worth. SEPPAA, however, 
eliminates the ability of a going concern to terminate an underfunded pension 
plan] SEPPAA also increased an employer's liability by giving the PBGC a 
secondary claim against the firm equal to 75 percent of the value of unfunded 
guaranteed vested benefits not covered by the PBGC's prior claim) 
In 1987, Congress restricted even further the ability of a firm to terminate an un- 
derfunded plan. The Pension Protection Act requires firms that wish to terminate 
an underfunded plan in a reorganization to demonstrate that the termination is 
necessary for the continued existence of the firm. 9 
Table 1 compares an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits over 
different time periods. The conclusion from table 1 is clear: an employer's liability 
for unfunded pension benefits has increased over time. 
The PBGC initially charged all firms a flat annual fee of $1 per employee for the 
insurance. This fee was increased in 1978 to $2.60, and again in 1986 to $8.50. In 
1988, the fee increased to $16 per employee plus an additional $6 for every $1,000 
that the plan was underfunded per employee. However, the maximum fee is $50 
per employee. 
3. The model 
3.1. Description 
A single period model is developed to examine the effects of  the pension system on 
the operating decisions of the firm. In the model, the firm has two decision 
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Table L Description of employers' liability for unfunded pension liabilities. 
ERISA SEPPAA PPA 
Prior to 1974  1974-1985 1986-1988 1988-+? 
Going concern 
Able to terminate Yes Yes No No 
Employer liability 0 30% of net * * 
worth 
Reorganization 
Able to terminate 
Employer liability 
Yes Yes Yes 
0 30% of net 30% of 
worth net worth 









30% of net 
worth + 75% of 
unfunded 
liabilities. 
*Not relevant because termination is not possible. 
Notes: Assumptions--No employer guarantee. 
ERISA--Employee Retirment Income Security Act of 1974. 
SEPPAA--Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1985. 
PPA--Pension Protection Act of 1987. 
variables: the amount of labor employed and the amount of capital employed. 
Two times are distinguished: the beginning of the period and the end. The 
decisions are made under uncertainty at the beginning of the period. At the end of 
the period, the random variables are revealed, and the payoffs to the firm's 
claimants are made. The notation for the model is summarized in table 2. 
3.2. The beginning-of-period decisions 
At the beginning of the period, the firm contracts with its factors of production: 
labor and capital. Let L denote the number of employees and K the number of 
units of capital employed. Labor is compensated with a wage, w, paid at the begin- 
ning of the period, and with a promised pension benefit, b, to be paid at the end. 
Each unit of capital is compensated at the beginning of the period with a rental 
rate, p.10 The current wage, w, the pension benefit, b, and the rental rate for capital, 
p, are determined by the labor and capital markets, and are exogenous to the 
model.ll 
Also at the beginning of the period, the firm contributes to a pension fund (the 
funding decision) and invests the money in securities (the asset allocation deci- 
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T a b l e  Z Notat ion.  
BOP = the beg inn ing  o f  the period. 
EOP = the end  of  the period. 
Q ( K , L )  = product ion  funct ion  which  is h o m o g e n e o u s  of  degree one. 
P = price o f  ou tpu t  ( u n k n o w n  at BOP, revealed at EOP). 
w = wage rate (known at BOP). 
P = cost o f  capital  (known at BOP). 
b = p romised  pens ion  benefi t  per  un i t  o f  labor  (known at BOP). 
L = a m o u n t  o f  labor  employed  (chosen at BOP). 
K = a m o u n t  o f  capital  employed  (chosen  at BOP). 
[3 = proport ion of  pens ion  assets invested in the risky security (exogenous).  
I = inves tment  by equityholders .  
C = c B  = cont r ibut ion  to the pens ion  fund.  
R = P * Q ( K , L )  = income  f rom operat ions.  
B = b L  = pens ion  liabilities at the  end o f  the period. 
= c o m m o n  tax rate on  interest income = corporate tax rate. 
r = equi l ibr ium expected return on  equity (known at BOP). 
r f  = before-tax equi l ibr ium return on  the  risk-free security. 
= r[3 + rf(1 - [3)(1 - ~) = expected after-tax rate o f  return on  pens ion  assets  for a taxable investor. 
et = rf3 + rf(1 - [3) = expected rate of  return on pens ion  assets  for a non taxab le  investor. 
r a = after-tax expected rate of  return on  the firm's productive assets. 
A o  = C e  a - g  = BOP value  o f  pens ion  assets. 
"( = PBGC' s  c la im on the net  worth of  the  firm. 
A 1 = EOP value  of  pens ion  assets. 
Z = A0 + ¥ Re-r~ 
sion). Let B equal the total amount of promised pension benefits (B = bL), and let 
C represent the contribution to the pension fund. The contribution to the pension 
fund is modeled as a constant times the promised pension benefit: 
C = c B .  
This assumption captures the dependence of the contribution on the total amount 
of promised pension benefits and therefore on the amount of labor employed. The 
parameter c is exogenous in this model. 
Consistent with the literature on the management of pension funds, I assume 
that there exist two securities in which the pension assets are invested: risk-free 
bonds and risky equity. The returns on equity are not taxed, whereas the returns on 
bonds are taxable to individual investors but not to the pension fund. The equilib- 
rium expected return on equity is r, and the equilibrium before-tax return on 
b o n d s  i s  r f .  L e t  1: r e p r e s e n t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  t a x  r a t e  f o r  i n v e s t o r s  o n  i n t e r e s t  i n c o m e  
a n d  a l s o  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  t a x  r a t e .  ~2 
T h e  p a r a m e t e r ,  [3, r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p e n s i o n  a s s e t s  i n v e s t e d  i n  
e q u i t y ]  3 T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  e x p e c t e d  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  o n  t h e  p e n s i o n  a s s e t s  i s  
- -  ~ r  + ( 1  - ~)rr. 
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This rate of return is greater than a taxable investor could expect to earn if he/she 
invested in the same portfolio. In particular, the expected rate of return to a taxable 
investor is 
~t = 13r + ( 1  - 1 3 ) r i ( 1  - ~ ) .  
The value of the pension assets at the beginning of the period is denoted byA0. 
Notice that a distinction is made between the contribution to the pension fund, C, 
and the beginning of period value of the pension assets, A0. These values may dif- 
fer because of the tax treatment of the pension plan. Consider the value of a $1 
contribution to the pension fund. The expected value of the dollar at the end of the 
period is e ~, where ct is the expected rate of return on pension assets. The appropri- 
ate discount rate for finding the present value ofe ~ is g, the after-tax rate of return a 
taxable shareholder could expect to earn on the same assets. Thus, the difference: 
Ao - C = C(e ~-' - 1), 
represents the net present value of contributing C dollars to the pension fund. If all 
of the pension assets are invested in equity (¥ = 1), then ct equals g, and therefore, 
A0 equals C. 
Summarizing, the decision variables are the choice of labor and capital (L,K). 
The pension funding and asset allocation policies, represented by the parameters c 
and 13, respectively, are exogenous. The funds needed to pay the factors of produc- 
tion and to contribute to the pension fund are obtained from equityholders. Thus, 
the investment by equityholders at the beginning of the period is given by 
I =  wL + cbL + 9K + f (L) .  
The first term represents the current wages paid to employees. The second term is 
the contribution to the pension fund, and the third term represents the expendi- 
ture on capital. The last te rm,f  (L), is the insurance premium paid to the PBGC. 
Initially, f (L)  was equal to L. Under current PBGC rules, 
f ( L ) =  [16 + Max(O,  M i n (  6(Be-~f -A°)  ,34))3  
3.3. The end-of-period payoffs 
Let P be the price of output at the end of the period and A~ be the end-of-period 
value of the pension assets. 14 The revenue from production, R, is equal PQ(K,L), 
where Q(K,L) is a linearly homogeneous production function, is 
The firm's liability for unfunded pension benefits is modeled by the parameter ~" 
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which represents  the p ropor t ion  of the firm's net worth that  backs  pens ion  
benefits. Over  the 1974-1985 period, y equaled  0.3. Since 1985, Congress has not 
only  explicitly increased y but  it has  also implicit ly increased 7 by  restricting the 
ability of  a f irm to terminate  an  under funded  plan. Presently,  ,{ is close to unity, 
that  is, pens ion  benefits  are fully backed  by  corporate  assets. I f  the end-of-period 
value of  the pens ion  assets plus y percent  o f  the revenue f rom operat ions  is greater 
t han  the p romised  pens ion  benefi ts  (i.e., i fA t + y R >~ B), then  the firm pays  all of  
the pens ion  benefits  and  distributes the remain ing  pens ion  assets and  income 
from operat ions  to the firm's shareholders.  
I f  the end-of-per iod value of  the pens ion  assets plus 7 percent  of  the income 
f rom opera t ions  is less than  the p romised  pens ion  benefi t  (i.e., if  A1 + y R < B), 
then the firm defaults on its pens ion  obligations. In  this case, the P B G C  claims the 
pens ion  assets and  assumes  the pens ion  liability. In  addition, the P B G C  claims y 
percent  of  the firm's net worth which is equal  to 7 percent  o f  the income from 
operations.  The  employees  receive their p romised  pens ion  benefits f rom the 
PBGC.  Tab le  3 summar izes  the payoffs. 
The  end-of-per iod payof f  to equityholders is 
R + A ~ - B + M a x ( B - A ~ - ¥ R , 0 ) .  
The beginning-of-per iod  value of  this cash flow is 
R e  - ~  + A o  - Be-r/(~-~) + Put  (Z ,B ,o ) ,  
where 
Table 3. EOP payoffs. 
Payoff to Payoff to Payoff to 
States Equityholders Beneficiaries PBGC 
AI>/B R + A i - B  B 
A I < B  
& R + A 1 - B  B 
yR + AL>~B 
A I < B  
& (1 - y)R B 
y R + A I < B  
Summary Max [R + A 1 - B,(1 - y)R]* B 
0 
0 
A I + y R - B  
Min [0,A 1 + 3'R - B] 
*Max [R +A I - B,(l - y)R] = R +A 1 - B + Max [B - A  1 - yR. 0] 
Definitions: 
A 1 = end-of-period value of the pension assets. 
B = end-of-period value of the pension liability (known at the beginning of period). 
R = end-of-period value of the net worth of the firm. 
y = percent of net worth that the employer is liable for. 
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Z = Ao  + y R e  -ra, 
A0 = beginning-of-period value of the pension assets, 
and the bar over a variable indicates the expected value. The discount rate, ra, is 
the equilibrium after-tax discount rate for the firm's expected revenue from pro- 
duction. The final term represents the value of a European put option with the ini- 
tial value of the underlying asset being Z and with an exercise price B. The stan- 
dard deviation of the rate of return on the underlying asset is denoted by ~. The 
standard Black-Scholes model is used to value the pension put option. 16 
3.4. T h e  f i r m ' s  p r o b l e m  
The before-corporate-tax value of the firm is equal to the beginning of period 
value of the cash flows less the expenditures on inputs: 
V = f i * Q ( K , L ) e  -ra - w L  - 9 K  + Ao - C - Be-rY (1-~) 
+ PutlZ,B,~] - f (L) .  
The firm maximizes V by choosing L and K. The first three terms represent the 
value of a firm without a defined benefit pension plan, and the next five terms are 
due to the pension plan. 
The first-order conditions are as follows: 17 
0 Put O Z  
K :  P Q x e  -ra = 9 O Z  O K  " (1) 
L:  P Q c e  -ra = f c  + w + bc  - b [ c e  ~-~ - e-rS ~1-~)] 
0 Put O Z  0 Put 
- -  b .  ( 2 )  
O Z  OL OB 
Equation (1) implies that capital is employed until the value of the marginal 
product of capital equals the cost of capital: 
f ,  Q K e - ~  = 9 (1') 
1 - r [ 1  - N ( h ) ]  
The term [1 - N(h)] can be thought of as the probability that the firm will default 
on its pension obligations. ~8 This interpretation implies that the second term in the 
denominator of equation (1') equals the expected claim of the PBGC on the value 
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of the marginal product of capital. Thus, the cost of the capital is the rental fee for 
capital "grossed up" by one minus the expected claim of the PBGC. 
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. An increase in the use of capi- 
tal increases the expected cash flows from production. Since the PBGC has a con- 
tingent claim on Y percent of the firm's cash flows, not all of the increase in the 
value of expected cash flows accrues to shareholders. The second term in the 
denominator of expression (1') represents the portion of the value of the marginal 
product of capital that accrues to the PBGC. The problem is that the PBGC's in- 
surance policy is not priced properly. If the insurance were priced actuarially fair, 
then any reduction in the PBGC's risk due to higher expected cash flows would ac- 
crue to the firm through a reduction in the insurance premium. 
The magnitude of the effect of the PBGC insurance on the marginal cost of 
capital depends on a firm's financial condition. Suppose the pension plan is con- 
siderably overfunded. In this case, the effect of the PBGC insurance is small 
because it is unlikely that the firm will default on its pension obligations (i.e., IN(h) 
1). Suppose, on the other hand, that the pension fund is so underfunded that the 
firm is likely to default on its pension obligations (i.e.,N(h) ~ 0). In this case, the ef- 
fect of the PBGC insurance is large: Y percent of any increase in expected cash 
flows will accrue to the PBGC, not to the shareholders. If, for example, p = .12 and 
y = .3 and the firm is almost certain to default on pension liabilities, then the re- 
quired return to capital is approximately 17 percent. Under the same assumptions, 
but with 7 = .5, the cost of capital is 24 percent. Thus, the cost of capital can be 
significantly greater than the rental rate if the likelihood of default on pension 
obligations is high. 
The effect of increasing a firm's liability for unfunded pension benefits on the 
cost of capital is found by examining how an increase in y affects the right-hand 
side of equation (1'). The parameter 7 appears explicitly in the denominator of(l ').  
In addition, the term [1 -N(h)],  representing the probability that the firm will 
default on its pension obligations, is a decreasing function of 7. The product of 
[ 1  - N(h)] and y represents the expected proportion of the value of the marginal 
product of capital that does not accrue to shareholders. An incresae in 7 decreases 
the likelihood that the firm will default on its pension obligations (i.e., [1 - N(h)] 
decreases). On the other hand, an increase in Y increases the firm's liability if it 
defaults on pension obligations occurs. Thus, there are two effects of increasing Y 
on the cost of capital in this model. ~9 The dominating effect depends on the finan- 
cial condition of the firm. If the firm is very likely to default on its pension 
obligations, then a marginal increase in the firm's liability will increase the cost of 
capital. Intuitively, an increase in the firm's liability reduces the portion of the 
cash flows from capital that accrue to shareholders. On the other hand, if the firm 
is extremely unlikely to default on pension obligations, an increase in "f has very 
little effect on the cost of capital. 2° 
The result that the PBGC's insurance contract increases the cost of capital is 
analogous to the result found in Myers (1977) that a firm's investment decision is 
affected by the presence of risky debt. In Myers' paper, debtholders have a fixed 
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claim against the firm's assets, and this claim is negotiated prior to the firm's in- 
vestment decision. I fa  portion of the returns from a new investment project accrue 
to debtholders, then the incentive for equityholders to invest is reduced. Note, 
however, that debtholders and equityholders have an incentive to mitigate this 
problem through firm specific contractual arrangements and through renegotia- 
tion. (See Myers, 1977, for a discussion.) 
In this article, the PBGC has a contingent claim to a percentage of the firm's 
assets. This claim has been set by Congress prior to many firms' investment 
decisions. In states of the world in which pension assets are low relative to pension 
liabilities, a portion of the returns on new investments accrue to the PBGC. Conse- 
quently, the incentive for equityholders to invest is reduced. Unlike the case of 
debt, specialized arrangements for dealing with this problem are not available 
under current PBGC rules. 
The first-order condition for the choice of labor can be written as equation 
(2'): 
P O L e  -ra = w + b e - 7 ( 1 - ~ )  - bc[e~'-~ ' - 1] +fL 
0 Put b 0 Put [bce,~_ ~ + Y P Q L e - r a  ] + O B  " (2') 
O Z  
The LHS of equation (2') equals the value of the marginal product of labor, and 
the RHS equals the marginal cost of labor. The firm employs labor until the value 
of its marginal product equals its marginal cost. The first two elements of the 
marginal cost are the current wage and the present value of the pension benefits. 
The third term represents the marginal tax benefits from the pension fund as an 
additional unit of labor is employed. The fourth term equals the additional in- 
surance premium for each unit of labor. The final terms represent the change in 
the value of the put option as an additional unit of labor is employed. 
In the absence of the tax treatment and the benefit insurance of defined-benefit 
plans, the marginal cost of labor would simply equal the current wage, w, plus the 
present value of the promised pension benefit discounted at the after-tax risk free 
rate, b e - 7  °-~). The institutional arrangements of the pension system, however, 
significantly alter the marginal cost of labor. Each of these factors is discussed 
subsequently. 
The marginal tax benefits from the pension fund are 
b c ( e  ~-~ - 1) > O. 
The term in parentheses is the net present value of each dollar contributed to the 
pension fund; it depends on the pension asset allocation decision. The term, bc,  is 
the contribution to the pension fund for each unit of labor; it depends on the pen- 
sion funding decision. If the firm invests all of the pension assets in equity, then 
ct = p and the tax benefits are zero. If the firm contributes as much as possible to 
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its pension fund (c = C=ax) and invests all of the pension assets in bonds, then the 
marginal tax benefits are maximized. 21 
Let c* equal the value of the funding variable that would make the pension 
assets equal to the pension liabilities, and suppose ¢ -- Cmax. Then, the marginal tax 
benefits can be written as 
bcmax (e  ~-~ - 1) = b c * ( e  ~ - "  - 1) + b(cmax - c * ) ( e  ~ - "  - 1). (3) 
The marginal tax benefit is comprised of two terms. The first term represents the 
marginal tax benefits if the firm contributed just enough to the pension fund to 
pay off its pension obligations. These tax benefits arise because the pension fund 
does not pay taxes on investment earnings, whereas employees do. As a result, the 
pension fund can earn a higher rate of return than employees. This analysis im- 
plicitly assumes that employees do not have alternative tax-deferred investment 
opportunities, such as IRAs. The existence of unlimited tax deferred investment 
opportunities would imply that the first term may not be part of the pension tax 
benefits. See Mumy (1985) for a thorough analysis of this issue. 
The second term represents the additional tax benefits if the firm contributes 
more to the pension fund than is needed to pay its pension obligations. These ad- 
ditional tax benefits arise because the pension fund can earn the before-tax rate of 
return, whereas shareholders can only earn the after-tax rate of return on taxable 
securities. If shareholders have unlimited tax deferred investment opportunities, 
then the second term in expression (3) would not be part of the tax benefits. Em- 
pirical evidence indicates that there is a premium paid for tax-exempt securities 
which implies that unlimied tax-deferred investment opportunities are not avail- 
able to the marginal investor. 22 
The marginal effect of a unit of labor on the value of the PBGC insurance is 
complicated, because an additional unit of labor changes the value of pension 
liabilities and also the value of assets backing pension liabilities. The pension 
liability increases as an additional unit of labor is employed because the total 
amount of promised benefits increases. The assets backing pension liabilities in- 
crease for two reasons: (1) the finn must contribute more to the pension fund, and 
(2) the cash flows of the firm backing pension liabilities increase by y percent of 
the value of the marginal product of labor. Thus, there are offsetting effects of an 
additional unit of labor on the value of the PBGC insurance. The following propo- 
sition, however, shows that one effect always dominates. 
O Put 
Propos i t ion . "  ~ is positive. 
Proof." See Appendix. 
The proposition states that, independent of the funding and asset allocation 
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decisions, the marginal effect of an additional unit of labor on the put option 
is positive. 
Thus, a benefit of employing labor is that it increases the value of the firm's fight 
to default on pension obligations. However, the firm must pay an additional fL 
dollars to the PBGC for the insurance. If 0 P u t / O L  is greater than fL, then the 
PBGC insurance reduces the cost of labor. On the other hand, iffL is greater than 
0 Pu t /OL ,  then the PBGC insurance increases the cost of labor. 
In summary, the tax treatment and the insurance aspects of defined benefit 
plans reduce the marginal cost of labor by the amount 




The magnitude of the subsidy depends on the funding and asset allocation 
policies of the firm. For example, if all the pension assets are invested in equity, 
then the tax benefits are zero. On the other hand, if all the pension assets are in- 
vested in debt and the firm contributes as much as possible to the pension fund, 
then the tax benefits are maximized. Finally, the marginal value of the put option 
is likely to be greater than the insurance premium when the plan is significant- 
ly underfunded. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
This article extends previous research on the management of corporate pension 
funds by examining the impact of the pension system on the operating decisions 
of the firm. Both the PBGC insurance arrangements and the tax treatment of 
defined benefit pension plans alter the relative costs of labor and capital. The 
PBGC insurance increases the cost of capital. In addition, the PBGC insurance 
causes the marginal cost of labor to be less than the value of the contractual com- 
pensation if the marginal value of the insurance is greater than the flat fee charged 
by the PBGC. Also, the corporate tax treatment of defined benefit pension plans 
lowers the cost of labor by providing a tax deferred investment opportunity for 
both employees and shareholders. 
The distortions induced by the tax and insurance arrangements depend on the 
financial pension policies of the firm. For example, the more underfunded the 
pension plan is, the greater is the cost of capital. The greater the proportion of 
assets invested in bonds, the greater the tax subsidy to labor. 
The analysis also illustrates an effect of the recent trend toward increasing a 
firm's liability for unfunded pension liabilities. By forcing firms to back pension 
benefits with corporate assets, the Congress has created a fixed claim to corporate 
assets that competes with equityholders' claims. A firm's liability for unfunded 
pension liabilities reduces shareholders' incentives to invest in capital because 
GOVERNMENT PENSION POLICY AND THE COST OF LABOR AND CAPITAL 17 
part of the returns to these investments are shared with the PBGC. Thus, increas- 
ing a firm's liability for unfunded pension benefits (without adjusting the pre- 
mium schedule) increases the cost of  capital. 
Notes 
1. Endogenizing the financial pension policies in this model does not provide new insights about 
these decisions; therefore, they are treated as exogenous to simplify the exposition. 
2. The other major type of pension plan is a defined-contribution plan. Under  a defined-contri- 
bution plan, a set amount  of money is contributed to a fund each period and the retiree receives the 
total contributions and the earnings on the contributions. TIAA-CREF is an example of a defined- 
contribution plan. Although more defined contribution plans exist in the United States than defined- 
benefit plans, approximately 75 percent of all pension plan participants are enrolled in defined- 
benefit plans. 
3. A firm can remove excess pension assets in one of two ways. First, the firm can terminate the over- 
funded plan and establish another plan that is less overfunded. A less visible way is to change the ac- 
tuarial assumptions and implicitly remove assets by contributing less to the fund. 
4. For a more thorough analysis of an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits, see Soble 
and associates (1982). 
5. Employees presumably understood the limited liability of employers with respect to pension 
claims, and consequently required higher (lower) compensation (in terms of higher wages) when the 
risk of not receiving their promised benefits increased (decreased). 
6. Actually, the PBGC has a ceiling on the benefits that are guaranteed. In addition, the guarantee of 
benefits arising from plan amendments  are phased in over a five-year period. 
7. SEPPAA allows an  underfunded pension plan termination (i.e., a distress termination) only if the 
employer satisfies one of the following conditions: (1) filed a petition seeking liquidation; (2) filed a 
petition seeking reorganization; (3) convinces the PBGC that  the firm will be unable to pay its debts 
and unable to continue in business if a termination is not granted; or (4) convinces the PBGC that the 
"costs of providing pension coverage has become unreasonably burdensome as a result of a declining 
work force." For further discussion, see chapter 22, "Plan Termination," in Employee Benefits Handbook 
edited by Jeffrey D. Mamorsky (1987). 
8. The PBGC's secondary claim can be paid in installments over a number  of years, and any yearly 
installment can be partially deferred if the firm does not have profits in that year. In addition, SEPPAA 
created a liability for pension commitments exceeding guaranteed benefits. 
9. The Pension Protection Act also increased a firm's liability for benefits exceeding guaranteed 
benefits. 
10. By paying wages at the beginning of the period and pension benefits at the end of the period, the 
model captures the deferred compensation aspects of actual pension plans. Also, by having wages and 
the rental fee for capital paid at the beginning of the period, these payments are not made contingent 
on the performance of the firm. This assumption eliminates potential incentive problems associated 
with labor and capital, and focuses the analysis on the incentive problems between equityholders and 
the PBGC. 
11. By taking the mix between wages and pension compensation as given, the analysis ignores the ef- 
fect of government pension policy on the terms of labor contracts. For an analysis of how ERISA 
altered the desirability of pension compensation, see Niehaus 0988). Also by taking the required com- 
pensation for labor and capital as given, the analysis ignores general equilibrium effects of government 
pension policy on the equilibrium costs of labor and capital. 
12. These assumptions are sufficient to obtain a Miller equilibrium, although they are not 
necessary. 
18 GREG NIEHAUS 
13. The portfolio is continuously rebalanced so that [3 is the proportion of pension assets invested in 
equity at all points in time. Also, taxes are paid continuously throughout the period. 
14. The price of output is assumed to follow a continuous process through time. This assumption is 
needed to use standard option pricing models later in the article. Production is assumed to take place at 
the end of the period, so the expected price at the end of the period is the relevant parameter for 
decisionmaking. 
15. The assumption of a linearly homogeneous production function is used to prove a proposition 
later in the article. 
16. In order for the put option to be valued in a manner  consistent with the Black-Scholes methodol- 
ogy, the value of the sum of income from operations and pension assets must follow a Brownian mo- 
tion process. More precisely, i f Z  t = yR t + At, then d Z / Z  = ~ d t + ~ dW, where Wis a standard Brown- 
Jan motion process. In this case, the value of the put is: 
Put [Z,B,c] = ZIN(h)  - 11 + Be-" fN(o  - h), 
where 
z = ( r  + A0), 
y = y f i*Q(K,L)e-ra  
h = -- log + + - - ,  
o 2 
N( ) = the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
Y represents the value of the corporate (nonpension) assets backing the pension liabilities. 
17. The second-order conditions are assumed to be satisfied. 
18. Technically, this interpretation is correct only if the assets backing the pension liabilities grow at 
the instantaneous rate of (rf + o2), where c~ is the instantaneous standard deviation of the under- 
lying asset. 
19. Another  effect of increasing the finn's liability (not modeled here) is a reduction in moral hazard 
problems such as underfunding and investing in risky assets. 
20. These statements can be shown more rigorously by differentiating the right-hand side of equa- 
tion (1') with respect to "{ and considering limiting cases. 
21. ERISA imposed min imum contribution rates for defined-benefit plans. In reality, there is no 
limit on the maximum contribution to a defined-benefit plan. However, there is an IRS limit on the 
amount  of pension contributions that receive preferential tax treatment. The parameter, Cmax, is intend- 
ed to capture the IRS constraint. 
22. See, for example, Trzcinka (1982). 
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Appendix. Proof of proposition. 
0 Put 
OL 
- [N(h) - 1] bce ~-~ + + e-rfN(o - h)b. 
Multiplying by L/L yields 
o~ut_ 1 [ ] 
OL L [ N ( h ) -  1] A o + L  OY + B e - r f N ( o - h ) .  
OLd 
The homogeneity of the production function implies 
Lar= r -  °~rK. 
OL OK 
Substituting yields 
~u,~,~ <' {,,<<~-,,[~o+ ~- ~-1 +"e-"~°-~'} " o , ,  , 
Combining terms yields 
OoLPUt Put - [N(h) - 1] ~KK J ~ O. 
